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Abstract 
In this paper, we examine the relation between the Big 4 and Second-tier auditors with auditor independence. Prior 
research suggests that the Big 4 audit firms are of higher independence than are non-Big 4 firms. The study also 
indicates a view that, both the public company respondents and audit firm respondents perceived the Big Four 
audit firms as having a higher auditor independence than other audit firms, which is consistent with findings of 
(Abu Bakar et al., 2005; DeAngelo, 1981b) 
Data were collected by two methods, a questionnaire survey (quantitative) and a number of semi-structured 
interviews (qualitative) to give both triangulation and amplification. The questionnaire was analysed using both 
conventional comparative statistics and multivariate methods. The sample of respondents comprised three 
groupings: accounts managers, financial managers and internal auditors working in Libyan public companies; 
managing partners, partners, audit supervisors and auditors working in audit firms in Libya; and controllers 
working for the Libyan Association of Auditors and Accountants (LAAA). 
The results of the study indicate two groups agreed that the big audit firms have enough financial resources and a 
large number of clients, which means they can resist client management pressure, and protect their reputation. 
Keywords: audit firms, accounting profession, developing countries, auditor independence, LAAA, public 
companies 
1. Introduction 
Auditor independence has been the subject matter of professional and academic debate in both developed and 
developing countries, for a long period of time (Abu Bakar, Rahman, & Rashid, 2005). The balance between 
independence and competence of the auditor and between professional relationships and personal relationships are 
fundamental to achieving high levels of audit quality (Richard, 2006). As studies dealing directly with auditor 
independence have focused on the appearance or perception of auditor independence, perceptions may not be 
correct, even though the use of investor perceptions may help an auditor to signal his/her quality and effect choices 
more effectively (see, for instance: Ferdinand, Bikki, & Gopal, 2007; Abu Bakar et al., 2005; Shawn & Dana, 
2008). 
2. Literature Review 
The majority of experiential research that tested for an association between audit firm size and auditor 
independence found that there is a positive association between them (Abu Bakar et al., 2005; DeAngelo, 1981b; 
Shawn & Dana, 2008). Essentially, a positive association means that the larger the audit firm size the greater the 
auditor’s independence. They confirm that large firms are more resistant to customer pressure thus maintaining 
higher audit independence. In fact, it has been argued that large firms, due to their very size, may be more able and 
motivated to provide better audits. Thus size has been equated with independence and also performance. 
Consistent with that (Abu Bakar et al., 2005) reported that audit firm size appears to be the most important factor to 
affect the independence of an auditor. 
However size may also be an important factor influencing the perceptions of the independence of the auditor 
(DeAngelo, 1981b; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). The size of audit firm is fundamental to perceived auditor 
independence because small firms are unable to develop appropriate financial resources, research facilities and 
staff to perform an examination of larger clients (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961, p. 213). In addition small firms would 
face the risk of dependence on a “single major client”, because the size of the firm’s client portfolio is small 
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relative to those of larger firms (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961, p. 213). Audit firms with large client portfolios might have 
stronger incentives to protect their reputation and independence (Chow et al., 1988; DeAngelo, 1981b; Kothari et 
al., 1988; Lys & Watts, 1994; Palmrose, 1988; Wallace, 1987). Thus, the issue of maintaining auditor 
independence is more crucial for smaller firms than larger firms. 
Three solutions to these stumbling blocks to smaller audit firms were suggested by Mautz & Sharaf (1961). These 
were as follows: to allow the status quo to continue with small firms providing a variety of services for their clients; 
to insist that they choose one of the two speciality service options (auditing and NAS) with which to supply their 
client, and finally to stop smaller firms from carrying out auditing services altogether on the grounds that they 
cannot provide auditing and NAS simultaneously and the revenue from the former service is much less than for 
bigger firms and so less reliable (p. 230). 
According to the “deep pockets hypothesis” argued by Dye (1993), large auditing firms are said to possess greater 
wealth, and therefore to be exposed to higher risk in the case of law suits by creditors or investors. Dye (1993) 
demonstrated that richer auditors have more incentive to be diligent in their investigations of client corporations, as 
their greater wealth makes them more vulnerable to lawsuits. Due to the deeper pockets of large firms, they would 
have more to lose in the case of audit failure (Clarkson & Simunic, 1994; Feltham, Hughes, & Simunic, 1991). 
Similar relationships between size and independence have been found by other researchers. Increased 
independence and less reliance on single clients with increased size were observed by Pearson (1980) and vice 
versa. Increased reliability of audit reports with size was reported by DeAngelo (1981b) as larger firms risked more 
by dishonest reporting and as a result may jeopardise their reputations. 
In recent research, Choi et al. (2008) indicated that a fee premium is charged by large audit firms because they face 
higher legal liability costs, and hence, have more incentive to make a better effort than smaller firms. These 
researchers suggest that the fee premium decreases as the legal regime becomes stronger because small auditors 
have a higher audit failure rate than Big Four auditors, and increase audit fees significantly more to compensate for 
their increase in legal liability costs. 
The literature on firm size has clearly highlighted that whilst different samples and methods have been used by 
different researchers, there is a positive relationship between firm size and audit quality. Specifically, large audit 
firms have more resources which they can direct to the recruitment and training process, thereby providing them 
with the human capability to detect and correct errors in financial statements. Moreover, as larger audit firms have 
reputations to preserve, they are careful to report deficiencies. That said many of the differences between large and 
small firms should be eliminated by the maintenance of professional standards and qualifications, and a more 
efficient regulatory framework. 
However, an advantage of smaller size was put forward by Gul (1991), and Shockley (1982) as this could lead to 
more personal relationships with clients. On the other hand according to Shockley (1981), using a questionnaire to 
obtain his data, there was also the disadvantage of increased risk of their independence being impaired. The data 
also revealed that respondents from local or regional offices demonstrated contrasting views which indicated a 
protective feeling towards smaller firms (Shockley, 1981). This view was supported by the work of Jackson-Heard 
(1987) a smaller auditor tended to be more influenced by managerial pressures than larger firms. Pearson & Ryans 
(1982) reported that the partners in small or medium-auditor firms disagreed with the contention that there was a 
positive relationship between the independence of the auditor and the size of audit firm. 
According to the relationship between size of auditor and users’ perception of the reliability and therefore 
confidence in the information content of financial reports, Goldman & Barley (1974) disputed that corporations 
walk to change from small to big auditor through initial public offerings due to the high reliance of banks and 
financial analysts on the reports certified by big auditors. 
Consistent with this argument, McKinley et al. (1985) revealed that the kind and size of the auditor were positively 
linked with auditor independence. He pointed out that financial reports audited by the Big Four auditors would be 
less expected to contain undetected fraud as compared to those audited by smaller firms. 
In addition, McLennan & Park, (2003) concluded that big auditors have greater technology and more capable 
workers than small auditors, and consequently have higher inducements to behave independently. As a result, 
according to other researchers (Davidson & Neu, 1993; Beatty, 1989) the information content of audit reports 
certified and formed by big auditors are considered to be more credible and reliable than those of smaller auditors. 
Based on the above theoretical arguments and empirical studies, it can be seen that size of the audit firm has an 
impact on perceptions of auditor independence. large audit firms were perceived to be more independent than 
smaller audit firms due to several reasons such as, large audit firms are not being economically dependent on one 
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or few clients for their income, not having a personalised mode of client service, not having close relationship with 
their clients, and having numerous experienced and qualified staff that allows them to provide high audit quality. 
However, as Goldman & Barlev (1974) mentioned it should not be concluded that large audit firms are immune to 
pressure by their clients that might impair their independence, especially when there is a high level of competition 
among large audit firms for clients. In addition, most of the previous studies were conducted in developed 
countries but little studies were done in developing countries such as Libya, where different political, economic 
and social systems exist which might shape the perceived impact of size of the audit firm on auditor independence. 
3. Methods and the Sampling Unit 
An aspect of the research that impacts significantly on the quality of the data that is collected is the selection of 
those who will participate in the research. For this reason Denscombe (2001) strongly recommends that in order to 
be able to use the best population sample for the research, the researchers should be able to make their own 
selection. Sekaran (2003, p. 265) defines population as: 
“The entire group of people, events or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate” 
For this study, the population was made up of two Libyan groups, the first being drawn from the staff of audit firms 
and the second being drawn from staff of industrial public companies. Within each group a further selection was 
made of three categories, these being auditors, managing partners and audit supervisors in the case of audit firms, 
and in the case of public companies, internal auditors, and financial managers and accounts managers. These 
specific groups were chosen since earlier researches had identified that these were the most appropriate groups to 
use for a study of auditor independence, since their perceptions of auditor independence were highly relevant and 
worth consideration. These two groups are comprised of individuals who all have professional qualifications and a 
high degree of training and were therefore able to make informed observations that were pertinent to this area of 
study. The following gives the reasons why these groups have been chosen as targets. 
3.1 Audit Firms 
who belong to the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA), have the right to practise as auditors 
and accountants, particularly, those who are registered with the General People's Committee and therefore fall 
under the People’s control, these firms were chosen because they are employed by the government to audit the 
financial statements of its corporations. In this study is to meet its objective of making an examination of a number 
of factors that impact on perceptions of auditor independence, it is vital to be aware of audit firms’ own perceptions 
of themselves in relation to each of the selected variables which may have an effect on auditor independence. 
According to the General People’s Committee for the inspection and control of the People’s in 2010 more than 260 
firms have been registered as firms dealing with auditing and consulting.  
3.2 Industrial Public Companies 
The choice was made of Industrial public companies because they have a wide experience of dealing with auditing 
firms and are the longest established and biggest firms dealing with the Libyan audit market, and therefore will 
hold opinions relating to auditor independence since they will have contracts with external auditors who will be 
responsible for the auditing of their financial statements. It is therefore of significant importance to know how the 
staff who are part of these companies, such as internal auditors, financial managers and account managers, 
perceive the external auditors’ independence, particular, these three classes were chosen because they have direct 
connection with the external auditors. The Libyan government currently owns about 121 industrial public 
companies. 
4. The Process of Sampling 
Once the population to be used for this study had been defined, a section of that population that could be seen as 
representative of the whole had to be selected, this process being known as sampling. Sekaran (2003, p. 266) 
defined sampling as: 
“The process of selecting a sufficient number of elements from the population, so that a study of the sample and an 
understanding of its properties or characteristics would make it possible for us to generalise such properties or 
characteristics to the population elements”. 
Samples are used for the collection of data, rather than an entire population, because it is more manageable in terms 
of cost and the use of various other resources, in particular where there are a number of elements involved and they 
are geographically wide-spread. It is important to choose the right technique for sampling from among the range of 
methods that exist. Commenting on this, Collis & Hussey, (2003) suggest that what makes a representative and 
good sample is one where the results that are collected from the sample can be relied upon to apply to the 
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population as a whole. They also state that a good sample must be: 
1) chosen at random meaning that each member within the population stands a chance of being chosen; 
2) of a sufficient size to enable it to meet the needs of the investigation; 
3) an unbiased sample. 
Sekaran (2003) maintains that there are two main ways in which a sample may be designed. The first is probability 
sampling which allows for each element of a population to have a chance which is known and equal of being a 
selected subject, and the second is non-probability where those potentially taking part do not have a known or 
predetermined chance of selection. In this study probability sampling was used in order for subjects from each of 
the target groups, which are the staff of audit firms and the staff of public companies, to be selected. The use of a 
random sampling method ensures that that there is an equal probability of each person in the targeted class being 
selected as part of the sample. This method of sampling also makes use of non-replacement sampling so that there 
is no chance of choosing a specific respondent more than once. The reasons for opting to use this method are firstly 
that it offers greater generalizability and the sample that is most representative, and second it helps to eliminate 
bias which means that it is possible to make an estimation of possible sampling errors (Sekaran, 2003). Since 
Tripoli, the capital of Libya, Benghazi, Mosratah and Al-Zawiah are the cities where most of the financial and 
commercial activities of Libya take place (Khorwatt, 2006; Mahmud, 1997) these were the locations where 
sampling dealing with the selection of subjects from the two targeted groups took place. This was for the following 
reasons: 
1) in excess of 80% of those audit firms registered with the General People's Committee for the People’s control 
and inspection are located in these cities; 
2) most of the economic and business activity take place here. 
3) and these four cities have more than 85% of the industrial public companies in Libya. 
Saunders et al. (2007) maintain that in order to have a good likelihood of obtaining a sampling distribution that is 
close to the norm, the sample size needs to be not less than 30%. They also make the point that where a sample is of 
a large absolute size there is the likelihood that it will better represent the population from which it is drawn than 
would be the case with a smaller sample. However, Cohen & Manion (1980) take the view that it is not possible to 
set down an exact number or percentage that needs to be used by all studies. It has been suggested by some authors 
that there are a number of considerations that need to be taken into account of when deciding on the size of the 
sample that is to be selected, such as the nature of the statistical analysis that is to be used, and how much 
variability is expected within the sample and the results; these considerations should be based on experience, the 
conventions that exist in a particular area of research in relation to what is considered an appropriate sample size, 
as well as the size of the whole population and issues of time and costs (Collis & Hussey, 2003; Saunders et al., 
2007). 
After due consideration being given to the issues discussed above relating to the size of the sample which, in this 
case, will receive questionnaires, the size of the sample to be taken from each targeted population was decided to 
be more than 50% of the population as follows; the first segment of the questionnaire sample involved 67 public 
companies and 137 audit firms working in Libya. The questionnaire was given to three different classes of public 
company respondents, namely, internal auditors, financial managers and accounts managers; while it was also 
given to three different classes of audit firm respondents, namely, managing partners, audit supervisors and 
auditors. The total number of questionnaires distributed to the public companies was 201: 67 questionnaires of 
each class in the public companies mentioned above. The total number of questionnaires distributed to audit firms 
working in Libya was 411; 137 questionnaires to people in each position in the audit firms listed above. On the one 
hand, on the demand side, the three classes in public companies were chosen because they were leaders in their 
company’s business activities and, hence, needed a monitoring mechanism to report on their performance (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). On the supply side, three classes of audit firms were considered because they were the main 
subjects in the issue of interest, supplying the documentation and/or information to the shareholders to evaluate for 
credibility (Humphrey, 1997). 
According to Saunders, et al. (2009) maintains that there are several structures for administering questionnaires: 
postal questionnaire, the delivery and collection approach, interviewer administered and questionnaire by 
telephone. In order to receive a high level of valid responses in the present case, the delivery and collection method 
was selected for gathering the data. The researcher distributed the questionnaire to the respondents and collected 
them again individually. This structure was meant to guarantee an adequate answer rate for the questionnaire 
survey. In addition, to establish contact for the interview phase later in the study, the delivery and collection 
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method was most appropriate. Furthermore, a postal questionnaire was also sent to respondents located in far-away 
places outside the chosen cities. To raise the number of responses, the respondents were given the option to send 
their reply in a reply paid envelope, which was already included in every copy of the questionnaire that was sent 
out. 
In the questionnaire survey, to obtain better responses, a reminder was sent to those respondents who had not yet 
sent in their questionnaire. This step was taken with due care and diligence, for if the researcher demonstrates 
inter-personal skills the respondents can become more co-operative. The total number of questionnaires completed 
and collected from public companies was 89; 28 (31.5%) from the internal auditors, 31 (34.9%) from the financial 
managers and 30 (33.6%) from the accounts managers, while the total number of questionnaires completed and 
collected from the audit firms was 192 questionnaires; 46 (26.8%) questionnaires from the managing partners, 52 
(25%) questionnaire from the audit supervisors and 94 (48.2%) from the auditors. 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Quantitative Findings 
5.1.1 The Size of Audit Firm and Auditor Independence 
To obtain the perspectives of the association between the size of audit firms and auditor independence, respondents 
from public companies staff and audit firms staff were invited to respond to the 10 questions shown in Table 1. 
The analysis of differences between public companies’ and audit firms’ responses is also reported in Table 6.7, 
which reveals six significant differences at the 1% level, as measured by the Mann Whitney U test. The level of 
agreement of public company respondents was significantly higher than audit firm respondents for six of ten 
statements. In addition, the audit firm respondents were highly agreed with the first and second significant 
questions (questions 3 and 4) more than it was by public company respondents. Whereas, the public company 
respondents were highly agreed with the other significant questions (questions 5, 6, 7 and 9) more than it was by 
audit firm respondents. These results might be due to the differences in the experience of public companies with 
different size of audit firms. 
The public company respondents perceived the big four audit firms as having higher levels of auditor 
independence than other audit firms, which is consistent with findings of (Abu Bakar et al., 2005; DeAngelo, 
1981b; Gul, 1989; Kleinman et al., 1998; McKinley et al., 1985). They concluded that audit firm size appears to be 
the most important factor influencing independence. The reasons for this may be, inter alia,: 1) big four audit firms 
have greater resources at their disposal than small audit firms, 2) the big four can ensure a greater variety of clients 
than small audit firms, 3) the big four have more experienced and better qualified staff than other audit firms, and 
4) the big four are powerful brands in their own right and are likely to be more conscious of and protective of their 
reputation. 
Since the overall responses of public company and audit firm respondents were not completely consistent, an 
attempt was made to separate the determinants of responses. As regards the size of audit firm, both sample groups 
were analysed in two ways (a) by position of respondents and (b) by the type of audit firm, using the Kruskal 
Wallis test. 
Both the mean and the median value was estimated in each case and reported below. The difference between the 
two measures of central tendency is indicative of asymmetry in the distribution of the responses and in the intensity 
of belief. Only in question 4 was there a significant difference (defined as > 0.5) between the responses of public 
company staff as measured by the mean and the median. That question suggests that the intensity of belief is in 
favour of the view amongst public company staff that the small audit firms also have the ability to discover fraud. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the evaluations given by the different statements regarding the size of audit firm and audit 
independence 
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Note: *Indicates that the distribution of responses between the categories is significantly different at the 1% level 
(Mann Whitney U test). 
 
5.1.2 The Perceptions of Size of Audit Firm and Auditor Independence Based on Position 
The Table 2 shows that analysis by position makes no significant differences in the distribution of public company 
and audit firm respondents, responses at either the 1% level or 5% level of significance. The intensity of belief 
noted in the previous section with respect to large firms and their ability to detect fraud appears to be only 
significant with account managers as opposed to financial managers and auditors. This suggests that account 
managers are more aware of the limitations of large firm audit practice at the transaction level. However, this result, 
whilst interesting, is not strongly supported by the evidence and is not pursued further in this research. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of different statements regarding the size of audit firm based on position 
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8 
1.5
27 
4.00 
3.9
6 
1.6
49 
3.00 
3.5
8 
1.4
94 
3.00 
3.1
0 
 
3. The 
Big Four 
audit 
1.3
78 
4.00 
3.4
6 
1.4
26 
4.00 
3.6
5 
1.1
97 
4.00 
4.2
9 
1.5
45 
5.00 
4.3
6 
1.3
10 
5.00 
4.1
3 
1.2
70 
5.00 
4.2
0 
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Stateme
nt 
Audit Firms staff Public Companies Staff 
Si
g Managing Partner 
N=46 
Audit Supervisor 
N=52 
Auditor N=94 
Internal Auditor 
N=28 
Financial Manager 
N=31 
Accounts Manager 
N=30 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
 
firms are 
more 
credible 
than 
smaller 
audit 
firms. 
4. The 
Big Four 
audit 
firms are 
more 
able than 
smaller 
firms to 
discover 
fraud and 
report it 
1.1
71 
4.00 
4.3
0 
0.9
17 
4.50 
4.4
6 
1.2
06 
4.00 
4.2
4 
1.1
66 
5.00 
4.6
1 
1.8
72 
4.00 
3.6
5 
1.7
30 
5.00 
3.8
0 
 
5. The 
public 
compani
es 
audited 
by the 
big audit 
firms are 
more 
attractive 
to 
investors 
and 
creditors 
1.3
32 
4.00 
3.7
8 
1.1
38 
4.00 
4.0
0 
1.2
70 
4.00 
4.1
5 
1.3
39 
5.00 
4.6
4 
1.7
62 
4.00 
3.6
5 
0.9
95 
5.00 
4.9
0 
 
6. The 
Big Four 
firms can 
obtain a 
greater 
variety of 
clients 
1.3
10 
4.00 
4.1
3 
1.0
91 
4.00 
4.2
1 
1.0
52 
4.00 
4.4
3 
1.5
65 
5.00 
4.3
2 
1.4
53 
5.00 
4.6
1 
1.1
65 
5.00 
4.7
7 
 
7. The 
Big Four 
audit 
firms are 
more 
likely to 
issue 
qualified 
audit 
reports. 
1.1
71 
4.00 
4.3
0 
1.3
23 
4.00 
3.8
8 
1.3
02 
4.00 
3.9
4 
1.6
18 
5.00 
4.2
1 
1.8
03 
5.00 
4.4
2 
1.6
01 
5.00 
4.3
0 
 
8 The 
Big Four 
audit 
firms can 
report the 
1.1
82 
4.00 
3.7
4 
1.2
42 
4.00 
3.4
2 
1.3
39 
4.00 
3.5
9 
1.2
86 
4.00 
3.8
9 
1.5
89 
4.00 
3.4
8 
1.4
32 
4.00 
3.5
0 
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Stateme
nt 
Audit Firms staff Public Companies Staff 
Si
g Managing Partner 
N=46 
Audit Supervisor 
N=52 
Auditor N=94 
Internal Auditor 
N=28 
Financial Manager 
N=31 
Accounts Manager 
N=30 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
S.
D 
Med
ian 
Me
an 
 
real 
financial 
situation 
of the 
clients 
more 
readily 
than 
other 
firms 
9. The 
Big Four 
audit 
firms 
have a 
higher 
level of 
independ
ence 
1.4
05 
4.00 
3.7
4 
1.2
59 
4.00 
4.0
6 
1.3
11 
4.00 
3.8
2 
1.3
97 
5.00 
4.6
1 
1.4
82 
4.00 
4.0
6 
1.5
64 
4.00 
3.9
7 
 
10.The 
local 
audit 
firms 
obtain 
lower 
level of 
independ
ence 
1.3
28 
4.00 
3.7
2 
0.8
26 
4.00 
3.9
4 
1.1
40 
4.00 
4.3
3 
1.5
24 
4.00 
3.8
9 
1.4
70 
4.00 
3.8
1 
1.6
27 
4.00 
3.8
0 
 
The distribution of responses between the categories indicates that there is no significantly different found at the 
1% and 5% levels respectively (using Kruskal Wallis test). 
 
5.1.3 The Perceptions of Size of Audit Firm and Auditor Independence Based on Type of Audit Firm 
(Local Audit Firms, Local audit firm affiliated to Arabic and International audit firm, and Local audit firm 
affiliated to one of the big audit firms). 
The analysis by types of audit firm (local audit firms, local affiliated to Arabic and international audit firm, and 
local audit firm affiliated to one of the big four audit firms), as reported in Table 6.9 shows two significant 
differences between the responses of the above types of audit firms at the 1% and 5% levels of significance, 
respectively, as measured by the Kruskal Wallis test. 
The level of agreement with the statements, The Big Four audit firms are more likely to issue qualified audit 
reports, and the big audit firms have a higher level of independence more than other audit firms were significantly 
higher for local audit firm affiliated to one of the big four audit firm respondents than local audit firm respondents. 
This discrepancy in the responses of the sample of the above types of audit firm respondents perhaps indicates the 
main reasons why, in their opinion, the big firms are perceived as having a higher level of independence than 
non-Big audit firms. The reasons may be summarised as follows: first the big audit firms conduct more powerful 
and effective tests; second they are more credible; third they are more likely to issue qualified reports; fourth they 
can plan the audit process more effectively, fifth they can obtain a variety of clients which means they do not need 
to depend on single client. Lastly they are more risk averse to damaging their reputation as a result of a potential 
public scandal. 
Generally, respondents’ perceptions of the relationship between firm size and the level of auditor independence are 
consistent with the concept that the size of audit firms is positively associated with auditor independence, and the 
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majority of the respondents in the last page of the questionnaire gave some reasons to support their views such as: 
1) the big four audit firms have adequate financial resources, 2) the big four audit firms have qualified and skilful 
staff, 3) the big four have experienced staff, 4) the big four have staff with professional qualifications, 5) they have 
the ability to detect the errors, 6) they can obtain a variety of clients which means they do not need to depend on 
single client, which supports to some results in the literature (see, for instance: Abu Bakar et al., 2005; DeAngelo, 
1981b; Gul, 1989; Kleinman et al., 1998; McKinley et al., 1985). 
As previously the intensity of belief was examined by comparison of the mean and median. Only is question 7 was 
there an out of range response on the part of staff of affiliated audit firms suggestive of a degree of loyalty to the 
larger affiliate in its ability to issue qualified audit reports. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of different statements regarding the size of audit firm based on type of audit firm 
Statement 
Local audit firms 
N=115) 
Local audit firms affiliated to an 
Arabic and International audit 
firms 
(N=58) 
Local audit firms affiliated to one 
of the Big Four audit firms (N=19) 
Sig 
Standard 
deviation 
Median Mean 
Standard 
deviation
Median Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median Mean 
1. The size of the 
audit firm has 
positively associated 
with the 
independence. 
1.308 5.00 4.38 1.364 4.00 4.29 1.408 5.00 4.74  
2. Both Big Four 
audit firms and small 
audit firms perform 
their work to the 
client without any 
influence 
1.144 4.00 3.84 1.101 4.00 3.66 0.964 3.00 3.53  
3. The Big Four 
audit firms are more 
credible than smaller 
audit firms. 
1.303 4.00 3.95 1.377 4.00 3.88 1.608 4.00 3.84  
4. The Big Four 
audit firms are more 
able than smaller 
firms to discover 
fraud and report it 
1.065 4.00 4.09 1.187 4.00 4.17 1.293 5.00 4.32  
5. The public 
companies audited 
by the big audit 
firms are more 
attractive to 
investors and 
creditors 
1.294 4.00 4.18 1.228 4.00 4.14 1.129 4.00 4.26  
6. The Big Four 
firms can obtain a 
greater variety of 
clients 
1.086 4.00 4.36 1.101 4.00 4.26 1.471 4.00 4.05  
7. The Big Four 
audit firms are more 
likely to issue 
qualified audit 
reports. 
1.003 4.00 3.50 1.536 4.00 4.03 1.134 4.00 4.21 * 
8 The Big Four audit 
firms can report the 
real financial 
1.208 4.00 3.56 1.439 4.00 3.59 1.204 4.00 3.68  
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Statement 
Local audit firms 
N=115) 
Local audit firms affiliated to an 
Arabic and International audit 
firms 
(N=58) 
Local audit firms affiliated to one 
of the Big Four audit firms (N=19) 
Sig 
Standard 
deviation 
Median Mean 
Standard 
deviation
Median Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Median Mean 
situation of the 
clients more readily 
than other firms 
9. The Big Four 
audit firms have a 
higher level of 
independence 
1.288 4.00 3.11 1.225 4.00 3.84 152 4.00 4.16 ** 
10.The local audit 
firms obtain lower 
level of 
independence 
1.058 4.00 4.22 1.249 4.00 3.81 1.177 4.00 4.05  
Note: *, ** Indicates that the distribution of responses between the categories is significantly different at the 1% 
and 5% levels respectively (using Kruskal Wallis test). 
 
5.2 Qualitative Findings 
 
Table 4. Categories of organisations and the number of the interviewees and their position 
Organisation public company audit firm LAAA 
position internal auditor 
financial 
manager 
accounts 
manager 
audit 
supervisor 
managing
partner 
auditor controller Total
Number of 
interviewees 3 3 1 4 3 4 3 21 
 
In this section, the researcher attempted to elicit the interviewees’ opinions regarding the ways to improve the level 
of the perceptions of auditor independence in the Libyan audit market. In the questionnaire survey results shown in 
table 1, about 64.6% of audit firm respondents and 65.2% of public company respondents either disagree or 
strongly disagree with the statement: An independent body should allocate audit clients to audit firms e.g. the 
LAAA. Similarly, the majority of the interviewees confirmed this result, and they observed that this can lessen 
competition in the audit market and that it was not adopted in developed countries. It will act as a deterrent to the 
ambitions of public companies to work with the audit firms which have a reputation in the market and good 
experience about the business type of those companies. However, most of the interviewees suggested that a 
representative from the LAAA should attend the Annual General Meetings of Shareholders to monitor the 
appointment of the external auditor, and ensure that was no manipulation by company management in selecting the 
external auditor. 
The results of the questionnaire survey presented in, table 1, revealed that 65.1% of audit firm respondents and 
74.1% of public company respondents agreed with the statement: Public companies should disclose the amount of 
audit and NAS fees paid in the annual report. The majority of the interviewees supported this finding, and they 
agreed that the disclosure of the audit and NAS fees in the clients’ financial reports would enhance auditor 
independence. Moreover, they pointed out that the disclosure of audit and NAS in the annual reports could tell the 
shareholders about the amount of fees which were given to the audit firm, and then they can discuss the level with 
the management if it seems too high. An audit supervisor of a local audit firm affiliated to a foreign audit firm 
remarked: 
“I think the financial statements of the companies should include the amount of audit fees because that will help 
to remove any doubt if there is an inappropriate personal relationship between the auditor and management, 
(business under the table). Another important point is that the disclosure will give a complete picture to 
shareholders and the general public about those fees and then can discuss that with the management if they are 
not satisfied with the fees.” 
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In contrast, a minority of interviewees argued that the LAAA should establish regulations and procedures for audit 
firms to require them to disclose the kind and amount of NAS supplied to clients, as is the practice in developed 
countries. 
Most interviewees believed that to improve the perception of auditor independence in the Libyan audit market the 
LAAA should adopt international auditing standards and accounting principles, since there are no specific local 
standards issued in Libya. Furthermore, most audit firms working in Libya adopt the accounting principles and 
auditing standards of the UK or the USA. An owner of a local audit firm pointed out: 
“I think adopting the accounting principles and auditing standards of the UK or USA is better than issuing new 
local standards, because the majority of audit firms in Libya understand and have a very good idea about those 
standards.” 
Finally, a minority of interviewees criticised this idea and asked the LAAA to establish local standards like other 
developing countries, because the audit market in Libya is completely different to the market in the USA and the 
UK. 
6. Summary and Review of Findings 
The majority of responses from public companies staff and audit firms staff showed that the Libyan Association 
of Accountants and Auditors (LAAA) should adopt international auditing standards and accounting principles as 
an important step to improve the auditing profession and the perception of auditor independence in the Libyan 
audit market. Moreover, the majority of respondents had shown their dissatisfaction over allocating audit clients 
to audit firms by an independent body, such as the LAAA, perhaps because of respondents’ desire to avoid audit 
firms thinking of establishing personal relationships with that body, which might have a negative effect on their 
reputation. Another reason for this is to give an opportunity to company management to choose the external 
auditor who can provide professional work and support its financial position by the auditing report. More 
important, the majority of public companies’ and audit firms’ responses revealed a preference for a law or 
regulation to be issued requiring public companies to disclose in their financial statements the amount of audit 
and non-audit service fees paid. This result recommends that this type of disclosure might identify, to interested 
parties, the type of association existing between the audit firm and the client. 
These findings were confirmed by the majority of interviewees, especially the adoption of international 
accounting principles and auditing standards, rather than establishing local standards to improve auditing as a 
profession; it would at the same time help foreign audit firms to work in Libya without any professional 
difficulties. Furthermore, the interviewees showed dissatisfaction for an independent body such as the LAAA to 
allocate customers to audit firms, indicating that this might make the audit market in Libya less competitive, and 
that this action is not implemented in developed countries. 
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